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Abstract
Asset price data imply a large degree of international risk sharing, while aggregate consump-
tion data do not. We show that a model with trade in goods and endogenously segmented
asset markets can account for this puzzling discrepancy. Active households—who pay a fixed
cost to transfer money into or out of assets—share risk within and across countries, and
their marginal utility growth prices assets, so asset prices imply high risk sharing. Inactive
households consume their current income and do not share risk, so aggregate consumption
(which averages across all households) reflects lower risk sharing. The model also provides
a resolution to the Backus-Smith-Kollmann puzzle.
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1 Introduction
How much do countries share risk through international financial markets, and how large
are the gains from doing so? The answers to these questions depend on how risk sharing
is measured. Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) show that measures of risk sharing
based on asset price data imply significant international risk sharing, while measures based
on aggregate consumption data display much less risk sharing.1 As a consequence, as shown
by Lewis (2000), welfare gains from risk sharing based on stock returns are higher than those
based on aggregate consumption.
The discrepancy in these risk sharing measures is puzzling. In standard international
macro models, consumption determines asset prices, rendering consumption-based and asset
price-based measures of risk sharing identical. Resolving this puzzle involves either changing
the preferences used in standard models or modifying the asset market structure, as discussed
by Brandt, Cochrane and Santa-Clara. In this paper, we take the latter route, and evaluate
the extent to which frictions that endogenously limit participation in asset markets can
account for the discrepancy between the asset price-based and consumption-based measures
of international risk sharing.
We analyze a two-country monetary model with international trade in assets along the
lines of Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2002, 2009) (henceforth AAK02 and AAK09), in
which households pay heterogenous fixed costs to exchange money for interest-bearing assets.
Households face idiosyncratic income shocks, and asset markets are endogenously segmented
because only a fraction of households at any point in time find it beneficial to pay the fixed
cost to access their assets.2 We enrich this model with real aggregate shocks and trade in
goods, features which are essential for generating movements in aggregate consumption and
risk sharing across countries. Indeed, without trade, consumption is constrained by domestic
resources and there is no risk sharing.
Limited asset market participation leads to differences in the asset price-based and
consumption-based risk sharing measures. Households that actively adjust their asset hold-
ings share risk among each other, both within and across countries. Since these households’
marginal utility growth determines asset prices, there is a high degree of international risk
sharing based on asset prices. On the other hand, these households account for a time-varying
fraction of aggregate consumption in each country, so measures of consumption imply a low
1In particular, Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) show that stochastic discount factors derived
from stock prices are highly correlated across countries, indicating significant international risk sharing, while
marginal utility growth derived from aggregate consumption is weakly correlated across countries, indicating
much less risk sharing.
2In AAK02, households have idiosyncratic income shocks, while in AAK09, households have heteroge-
neous fixed costs. We incorporate both these features of household heterogeneity in our model.
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degree of international risk sharing at the aggregate level.
We quantify this mechanism by calibrating our model to match the cross-sectional vari-
ance of household income and consumption in US data and the fraction of households actively
adjusting their assets, along with the time series properties of aggregate traded and non-
traded output in the US and an aggregate of 21 OECD trading partners. We compute
risk sharing measures in the model based on stochastic discount factors derived from as-
set prices and based on aggregate consumption. The model predicts a high cross-country
correlation of the equity-price based discount factors—about 0.85—and a cross-country cor-
relation of aggregate consumption that is much lower—about 0.32. These values are in
line with the empirical findings in Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006). Both asset
market segmentation and trade in goods are necessary to generate the discrepancy between
consumption-based and asset price-based measures of risk sharing in our framework. To
illustrate this, we consider two alternative market structures that eliminate, in turn, these
key features. In a frictionless, complete markets model (with no asset market segmentation),
the risk sharing measures are both above 0.9, reflecting relatively high risk sharing. In a
segmented markets model with no trade in goods, the ordering of the risk sharing statistics
is opposite: aggregate consumption reflects better risk sharing than asset prices.
In our model, underlying the difference between asset-price based and consumption-based
measures of risk sharing is the prediction that active households’ consumption is more highly
correlated across countries than inactive households’ consumption. We provide suggestive ev-
idence for this implication using micro data from the US (the Consumer Expenditure Survey,
or CEX) and the UK (the Family Expenditure Survey, or FES), showing that assetholders
in the two countries have more highly correlated consumption than non-assetholders.
Our model also generates a negative correlation between the real exchange rate and the
ratio of aggregate consumption across countries, offering a resolution to the Backus-Smith-
Kollmann puzzle (Backus and Smith (1993), Kollmann (1995)).3 In the standard complete
markets model, the ratio of two countries’ aggregate consumption is perfectly correlated with
the real exchange rate, but in the data this correlation is often negative (see calculations
for G7 countries in Table 2). In our model, the ratio of active households’ consumption,
not aggregate consumption, is perfectly correlated with the real exchange rate. We find the
correlation of relative aggregate consumption with the real exchange rate is −0.8. Traded
output shocks and monetary shocks generate this negative correlation, because they move
the ratios of relative aggregate consumption and relative active consumption in opposite
directions. Non-traded shocks move the ratios of relative consumption in the same direction,
3The Backus-Smith-Kollmann puzzle is also referred to in the literature as the consumption-real exchange
rate anomaly.
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but lead to a low cross-country correlation in aggregate consumption.4,5
A version of our model with an exogenous division of active and inactive households
yields both a negative consumption-real exchange rate correlation (as also shown in Koll-
mann (2012)) and a discrepancy between asset-price based and consumption-based risk shar-
ing measures, but our model with endogenously segmented markets has additional important
implications. In particular, the fraction of households actively participating varies over time
in response to shocks that change the incentive to participate. One implication is that en-
dogenous movements in the fraction of inactive households and their average income actually
reinforce risk sharing and slightly raise the consumption-real exchange rate correlation. A
related cross-sectional implication is that higher average inflation in our model is associated
with more frequent asset market activity, as inflation reduces the value of inactive households’
income, leading to better international risk sharing. Using data for 86 countries, we doc-
ument that average inflation is strongly positively associated with the correlation between
the real exchange rate and consumption relative to the US. Our model with endogenous
segmentation is consistent with this fact, while the exogenously segmented model is not.
Given that our benchmark model can address the discrepancy between the asset-price
based and consumption-based measures of risk sharing, we employ it to evaluate the welfare
effects of access to international financial markets. We construct alternative measures of
welfare gains relative to financial autarky based on actual ex ante average utility across
households, utility of aggregate consumption, or utility of active households’ consumption.
We find that active consumption-based welfare gains are significantly larger compared to
aggregate consumption-based gains, consistent with Lewis (2000)’s findings that asset prices
imply higher welfare gains than aggregate consumption. With a coefficient of relative risk
aversion of two, the welfare gain measured from active consumption is an order of magnitude
larger than the gain measured from aggregate consumption.
Other papers that explain the discrepancy between consumption-based and asset price-
based measures of risk sharing include Colacito and Croce (2011) and Lewis and Liu (2015).
In these papers, Epstein-Zin preferences and long-run consumption risk result in a separation
between asset prices and contemporaneous aggregate consumption levels, which generates
4The role of non-traded goods in reducing international consumption correlations has been well-studied,
going back to, e.g. Stockman and Dellas (1989), Tesar (1993), and Stockman and Tesar (1995). However,
while adding non-traded goods per se reduces consumption correlations, it does not account for a difference
in consumption-based and asset price-based risk sharing measures or a low consumption-real exchange rate
correlation in the absence of asset market frictions.
5An alternative asset market friction that has been used to explain the low consumption-real exchange
rate correlation is incomplete markets (e.g., Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008)). However, Devereux, Smith,
and Yetman (2012) (and references therein) show that a key prediction of an incomplete markets model—
that conditional forecasts of the real exchange rate and the ratio of consumption are perfectly correlated—is
not borne out in the data.
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cross-country asset price correlations that are larger than consumption correlations. We com-
plement these papers by evaluating how much we can explain with standard time-separable
preferences and a single asset market friction—segmented markets due to fixed costs—with
otherwise complete asset markets.
Our use of an endogenously segmented asset markets model with heterogeneous house-
holds to study international risk sharing is novel.6 AAK02 and AAK09 both analyze a
two-country model with only non-traded goods and monetary shocks, and their focus is on
interest rates and exchange rates, while aggregate consumption is essentially constant due
to the absence of real shocks. Both papers conjecture that segmented asset markets can
explain the Backus-Smith-Kollmann puzzle, but do not explore the implications of their
model for consumption. In contrast to these papers, our model has real shocks and trade in
goods to allow for movements in aggregate consumption and international risk sharing. In
an appendix, AAK09 consider an extension with traded goods, but no real shocks.
In addition to the exogenously segmented market model in Kollmann (2012), other
work that incorporates household heterogeneity to address international risk sharing and
the Backus-Smith-Kollmann puzzle includes Sungur (2004), and Kocherlakota and Pista-
ferri (2007).7 Sungur finds support for the AAK02 model’s relationship between the real
exchange rate and active households’ consumption in Italian regional data. Kocherlakota
and Pistaferri test the implications of a model with private information using US and UK
survey data and show that the ratio of higher moments of the consumption distribution
across countries is linked to the real exchange rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our benchmark
segmented asset markets model with traded and non-traded goods and characterizes equi-
librium. Section 3 contains all the quantitative analysis, including results on measures of
international risk sharing and welfare gains from financial markets. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We extend the two-country environment in AAK02 and AAK09, to include two main features.
Real shocks generate movements in aggregate consumption, and trade in goods is essential
for generating risk sharing across countries, while non-traded goods generate real exchange
6Endogenously segmented asset markets models have been used recently in studying the effects of mon-
etary shocks on inflation and interest rates. In addition to Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002), recent
examples are Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2009), Khan and Thomas (2015), and Dotsey and Guerron-
Quintana (2016).
7A related set of papers characterize differences in the consumption behaviour of stockholders and non-
stockholders (e.g., Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a)), or active and inactive stock market participants (e.g., Bona-
parte and Cooper (2009)) in closed economy settings.
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rate movements. We also incorporate households who do not hold assets as well as those
who hold assets but are sometimes inactive in asset markets.
We examine an infinite horizon, two-country, cash-in-advance economy with three goods—
one internationally traded good and two non-traded goods.8 We refer to the two countries
as “home” and “foreign”, and label foreign variables with an asterisk (∗). Each country
has a government and a continuum of households of measure one. Each household receives
endowments of traded and non-traded goods, consisting of an idiosyncratic component and
an aggregate component. Home households use the home currency (hereafter referred to as
dollars) and foreign households use the foreign currency (euros) to purchase goods. Exoge-
nous fluctuations in aggregate endowments and in money growth rates are the sources of
aggregate uncertainty.
Assetholding households can buy and sell assets to insure against idiosyncratic and ag-
gregate shocks. However, they must pay a fixed cost to transfer money into or out of their
asset balances. This fixed cost is a stand-in for frictions that explain why households do not
actively participate in asset markets every period, such as transactions costs for converting
interest-bearing assets into cash, as in Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956).9 This segmentation
of households into active participants and non-participants in the asset market disconnects
asset prices from aggregate consumption.
2.1 Timing and Uncertainty
In each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , there are three aggregate shocks and one idiosyncratic shock
in each country. The aggregate shocks in the home country are the endowments (YTt, YNt)
and the change in the money supply, µt = Mt/Mt−1, and in the foreign country they are
(Y ∗Tt, Y
∗
Nt, µ
∗
t ). The idiosyncratic shock yt determines an individual household’s endowments,
i.e. (YTtyt, YNtyt) in the home country and (Y
∗
Ttyt, Y
∗
Ntyt) in the foreign country. yt is drawn
i.i.d. across households and over time from a distribution with density fy, with a mean of 1.
We let st denote the realization of the six aggregate shocks, st = (YTt, YNt, µt, Y
∗
Tt, Y
∗
Nt, µ
∗
t ),
and define the aggregate state st = (s0, s1, . . . , st) as the history up to date t of these
shocks, with s0 given. We let g(s
t) denote the density of the aggregate state, st. We define
yt = (y0, y1, . . . , yt) as the history of idiosyncratic shocks for any household and, abusing
8We use a single traded good to focus on the difference between traded and non-traded goods, as in
Tesar (1993) and Backus and Smith (1993). Adding multiple traded goods as in, for example, Stockman and
Tesar (1995), would introduce an additional risk sharing channel through movements in the terms of trade
(as in Cole and Obstfeld (1991)).
9Another motivation for such a cost is that there is a fixed cost to ensuring repayment of private debt,
as described by Chatterjee and Corbae (1992). A fixed cost like this is also related to the stock market
participation cost considered by Luttmer (1999).
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notation, we let fy(y
t) denote the density of the idiosyncratic history, yt. In what follows,
the argument of fy will make it clear whether it refers to the density over histories or over
current realizations of the idiosyncratic shock.
2.2 Households
Households differ ex ante along two dimensions: first, a fraction ω are assetholders, and the
remaining 1−ω are non-assetholders. Second, among assetholders, the fixed cost of accessing
the asset market, γ, is drawn from a distribution fγ(γ). The fixed cost for each household is
constant over time. We describe the decision problem of a home country assetholder first.
A home country household enters period t with money balances from selling its endow-
ments from the previous period, t− 1, equal to (PT (st−1)YTt−1 + PN(st−1)YNt−1) yt−1, where
PT and PN denote the dollar prices of traded and non-traded goods. The household then
splits into a worker and a shopper. The worker sells the period-t endowment while the shop-
per decides whether to make any transfers to or from the asset market account and purchases
goods for consumption. The shopper’s cash-in-advance constraint is:
P (st)C(st, yt−1, γ) ≤ (PT (st−1)YTt−1 + PN(st−1)YNt−1) yt−1 (1)
+z(st, yt−1, γ)
[
τ(st, yt−1, γ)− P (st)γ]
where P (st) is the consumption price index, z(st, yt−1, γ) is an indicator equal to 1 if the
household makes a transfer and zero otherwise, and τ(st, yt−1, γ) is the amount transferred.
If τ > 0, the household withdraws money from the asset market, and if τ < 0, the household
saves some of its current income. Transferring to or from the asset market requires the
payment of a fixed amount γ of consumption goods. If z(st, yt−1, γ) = 0, the household
spends all of its available money in the current period and doesn’t change the amount of
assets it holds.
Consumption is a composite of traded and non-traded goods, with constant elasticity of
substitution σ > 0 and weight a ∈ (0, 1) on traded goods, C = (aC
σ−1
σ
T + (1 − a)C
σ−1
σ
N )
σ
σ−1 .
Standard derivations yield demands for traded and non-traded household consumption,
CT (s
t, yt−1, γ) =
(
PT (s
t)
aP (st)
)−σ
C(st, yt−1, γ) (2)
CN(s
t, yt−1, γ) =
(
PN(s
t)
(1− a)P (st)
)−σ
C(st, yt−1, γ) (3)
and a similar division of the fixed cost γ into traded and non-traded parts, γT (s
t) and γN(s
t).
The consumption price index is P (st) = (aσPT (s
t)1−σ + (1− a)σPN(st)1−σ) 11−σ .
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In the asset market, assetholding households trade aggregate- and idiosyncratic-state-
contingent assets with an international financial intermediary. Households only trade assets
of their own currency (absence of arbitrage ensures that this is without loss of generality).
The asset market budget constraint for a household with state (st, yt−1) in t ≥ 1 is∫ ∫
q(st, st+1, y
t−1, yt)B(st, st+1, yt−1, yt, γ)dst+1dyt (4)
+z(st, yt−1, γ)τ(st, yt−1, γ) ≤ B(st, yt−1, γ)
where q(st, st+1, y
t−1, yt) is the price of a claim to one unit of home currency in the asset
market in state (st+1, yt), and B(st, st+1, y
t−1, yt, γ) is the quantity of these claims that a
household with fixed cost γ purchases in state (st, yt−1). The payoff from asset holdings,
B(st, yt−1, γ), is allocated toward new asset purchases and transfers to the goods market.
Assetholders are initially endowed in period 0 with government debt. A home country
household with fixed cost γ has Bh0(γ) dollars of home government debt and Bf0(γ) euros
of foreign government debt. As in AAK09, these initial endowments of government debt are
contingent on the idiosyncratic fixed cost so as to make households initially identical within
and across countries. In period 0, there is trading in the asset market, but not the goods
market, so the asset market budget constraint is∫ ∫
q(s1, y0)B(s1, y0, γ)ds1dy0 ≤ Bh0(γ) + e0Bf0(γ) (5)
where e0 is the exchange rate in period 0, in dollars per euro.
Households in the home country have preferences given by:
∞∑
t=0
∫
st
∫
yt
βtU
(
C(st, yt−1, γ)
)
g(st)f(yt−1)dstdyt−1 (6)
where β ∈ (0, 1), U(C) = C1−η/(1− η) with η > 0.
A home household’s problem is to choose consumption, asset holdings, and money transfer
decisions to maximize utility (6) subject to the sequence of goods market budget constraints,
(1), and asset market budget constraints, (4) and (5). We assume that households do not
hold cash from one period to the next, either in the goods market or in the asset market,
spending all cash in the goods market on consumption, and allocating all cash in the asset
market to state-contingent assets. AAK02 develop sufficient conditions for not holding cash
to be optimal.
Assetholders in the foreign country face analogous constraints. The foreign price index
P ∗ and consumption levels C∗T , C
∗
N , γ
∗
T , γ
∗
N are defined similarly as in the home country,
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given prices P ∗T (s
t), P ∗N(s
t). A foreign household with fixed cost γ in state (st, yt−1) has the
cash-in-advance constraint:
P ∗(st)C∗(st, yt−1, γ) ≤ (P ∗T (st−1)Y ∗Tt−1 + P ∗N(st−1)Y ∗Nt−1) yt−1 (7)
+z∗(st, yt−1, γ)
[
τ ∗(st, yt−1, γ)− P ∗(st)γ]
while the foreign asset market budget constraints are:∫ ∫
q∗(st, st+1, yt−1, yt)B∗(st, st+1, yt−1, yt, γ)dst+1dyt (8)
+z∗(st, yt−1, γ)τ ∗(st, yt−1, γ) ≤ B∗(st, yt−1, γ)∫ ∫
q∗(s1, y0)B∗(s1, y0, γ)ds1dy0 ≤ B
∗
h0(γ)
e0
+B∗f0(γ) (9)
2.2.1 Non-assetholders
Non-assetholders face a version of the cash-in-advance constraint (1) with no possibility
of saving or withdrawing money, so they are analogous to the hand-to-mouth households
considered in Kollmann (2012). Their consumption, denoted with a subscript I, is given by:
CI(s
t, yt−1) = yt−1
PT (s
t−1)YTt−1 + PN(st−1)YNt−1
P (st)
(10)
and the division into traded and non-traded consumption, CIT and CIN , is similar to (2)-(3).
2.3 Asset market
There is a world financial intermediary that trades assets with households and the gov-
ernments. The intermediary has no wealth, so the net value of total trades equals zero.
The intermediary’s profits when the aggregate state is st are given by adding up the trans-
actions of (st+1, yt)-contingent assets of both currencies, at prices q(s
t, st+1, y
t−1, yt) and
q∗(st, st+1, yt−1, yt) , minus purchases of government debt at prices q(st, st+1), q∗(st, st+1),
which are prices of state-contingent claims to one unit of each currency in the next period.
We spell out the full intermediary’s maximization problem in appendix A.1, and highlight
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here the following no-arbitrage conditions that this problem yields:
q(st, st+1, y
t−1, yt) = q(st, st+1)f(yt) (11)
q∗(st, st+1, yt−1, yt) = q∗(st, st+1)f(yt) (12)
q(st, st+1) = q
∗(st, st+1)
e(st)
e(st+1)
(13)
Here, e(st) is the nominal exchange rate, in dollars per euro. Equations (11) and (12)
state that the price of one unit of national currency for a household in either country in
state (st+1, yt) must equal the price of one unit of currency weighted by the probability of
the idiosyncratic shock yt. Equation (13) confirms that restricting households to only hold
assets of their own currency is without loss of generality.
2.4 Market Clearing and Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of goods prices and asset prices along with consumption quantities
and asset holdings that solve households’ problems and satisfy the no-arbitrage conditions
(11)-(13), market clearing conditions for goods, money, and assets, and the governments’
budget constraints. Market clearing for traded goods is:
YTt + Y
∗
Tt =
∫ (
ω
∫ [
CT (s
t, yt−1, γ) + γT (st, γ)z(st, yt−1, γ)
]
fγ(γ)dγ (14)
+ (1− ω)CIT (st, yt−1)
)
fy(y
t−1)dyt−1
+
∫ (
ω
∫ [
C∗T (s
t, yt−1, γ) + γ∗T (s
t, γ)z∗(st, yt−1, γ)
]
fγ(γ)dγ
+ (1− ω)C∗IT (st, yt−1)
)
fy(y
t−1)dyt−1
We include the remaining equilibrium conditions for the home country, with the foreign
versions given by the obvious analogues. For non-traded goods in the home country,
YNt =
∫ (
ω
∫ [
CN(s
t, yt−1, γ) + γN(st, γ)z(st, yt−1, γ)
]
fγ(γ)dγ (15)
+ (1− ω)CIN(st, yt−1)
)
fy(y
t−1)dyt−1
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The government’s budget constraint is:
B(st) = M(st)−M(st−1) +
∫
q(st, st+1)B(s
t, st+1)dst+1 (16)
In the asset market, bond holdings summed across all households equals government debt:∫ ∫ ∫
B(st, st+1, y
t−1, yt, γ)fy(yt)fy(yt−1)fγ(γ)dyt+1dytdγ = B(st, st+1)
and the home money market clearing condition is:∫ ∫ [(
PT (s
t−1)YT (st−1) + PN(st−1)YN(st−1)
)
yt−1 (17)
+ ωz(st, yt−1, γ)
(
τ(st, yt−1, γ) + γ
)]
fy(y
t−1)fγ(γ)dyt−1dγ = M(st)
2.5 Characterizing Equilibrium
We follow a procedure similar to AAK02 to characterize an equilibrium with a few simple,
static conditions determining active and inactive households’ consumption allocations and
asset market participation decisions. We leave most of the detailed derivations to Appendix
A.1, while Appendix A.2 describes the computation method.
Active households pool their income within a period and have equal consumption (because
they are ex ante identical), denoted CA(s
t), which satisfies the following condition:
βtU ′(CA(st))g(st) = λP (st)Q(st) (18)
Here, λ is the multiplier on the date-0 budget constraint and Q(st) is the date-0 price of a
dollar. Equation (18) is a standard first-order condition given that active households can
smooth consumption across dates and states: it equates the marginal utility of consumption
in any state in which the household is active to the date-0 price of consumption weighted by
the marginal value of wealth.
Inactive assetholding households and non-assetholders consume the value of their in-
come, given by (10). Using the goods market clearing conditions (14)-(15) and the bud-
get constraint (1), we can write the money market clearing condition (17) as M(st) =
PT (s
t)YTt + PN(s
t)YNt. Then, inactive conusmption (10) can be written:
CI(s
t, yt−1) = yt−1
n(st)
µt
(19)
with n(st) = M(s
t)
P (st)
. Equation (19) shows that inactive households’ consumption is reduced
11
by money growth, as some of the real value of their inherited money balances is inflated
away each period.
Now, we consider the choice of whether to transfer into or out of the asset market account.
For a household with fixed cost γ in state (st, yt−1), the net benefit of becoming active can
be written as:
h(yt−1; st, γ) = U
(
CA(s
t)
)− U (yt−1n(st)
µt
)
− U ′ (CA(st)) [CA (st)+ γ − yt−1n(st)
µt
]
(20)
The first two terms of the function h in (20) give the increase in consumption from switching
from inactive to active. The third term gives the net cost of the change in asset balances nec-
essary to get to the active consumption level CA(s
t): an active household increases or reduces
asset balances, and this change is valued at the marginal utility of active consumption.
A household is active if the expression in (20) is positive. For any γ > 0, it is straight-
forward to verify the following properties of h:
• h(·; st, γ) has a minimum at yt−1 = CA(st)µ(st)n(st)
• h(·; st, γ) is decreasing for yt−1 < CA(st)µ(st)n(st) and increasing for yt−1 > CA(st)µ(s
t)
n(st)
• h(·; st, γ) is convex
• For CRRA utility, U(C) = C1−η/(1 − η) with η > 0, limyt−1→0 h(yt−1, st, γ) = ∞ and
limyt−1→∞ h(yt−1, s
t, γ) =∞
These properties imply that h is U-shaped, with two zeros. We refer to the two zeros
of h(·; st, γ) as yL(st, γ) and yH(st, γ), with yL < yH . These cutoffs define households’
asset market participation decision: if yt−1 ∈ [yL(st, γ), yH(st, γ)], the cost of transferring
outweighs the benefit, so a household is inactive in period t, and is active if yt−1 < yL(st, γ)
or yt−1 > yH(st, γ).
The characterization of consumption and asset market activity decisions is analogous in
the foreign country, where active households consume C∗A(s
t). Combining the first order
condition (18) with its foreign analogue yields the following risk sharing condition:
e(st)
P ∗ (st)
P (st)
=
λ∗
λ
U ′ (C∗A(s
t))
U ′ (CA(st))
(21)
This condition relates the ratio of marginal utilities to the real exchange rate, x(st) =
e(st)
P ∗(st)
P (st)
. The marginal utility of home country active households relative to foreign coun-
try active households’ rises in proportion to the appreciation of the home real exchange
12
rate. Active households therefore share risk internationally. In the standard complete mar-
kets model, equation (21) holds for aggregate consumption, but not in our model. This
distinction allows the model to account for the discrepancy between asset price-based and
consumption-based measures of risk sharing, and to explain a negative correlation between
relative aggregate consumption and the real exchange rate. Active households’ consumption
is a time-varying fraction of aggregate consumption:
C(st) = ω
∫ [
mA(s
t, γ)CA(s
t) +
n(st)
µt
∫ yH(st,γ)
yL(st,γ)
yfy(y)dy
]
fγ(γ)dγ + (1− ω)n(s
t)
µt
(22)
where mA(s
t, γ) = Fy (yL(s
t, γ))+1−Fy (yH(st, γ)) is the fraction of assetholding households
with fixed cost γ that are active, with Fy denoting the CDF associated with the density fy.
In the next section, we calibrate the model and quantify how large is the difference in risk
sharing measures, and we illustrate how risk sharing among active households is transmitted
to aggregate consumption.
3 Quantitative Analysis
We parameterize and simulate the model and compare its predictions to a variant with no
trade in goods and to a frictionless model. We show that only the model with trade and
segmented asset markets generates asset price-based risk sharing measures higher than the
consumption-based measures. Section 3.1 describes the parameters used in our quantita-
tive experiments. Section 3.2 discusses the main results on the asset price-based and the
consumption-based risk sharing measures and the Backus-Smith-Kollmann puzzle. We il-
lustrate the risk sharing mechanisms in our model in Section 3.3 and provide suggestive
evidence for the model’s mechanisms in Section 3.4. Welfare analysis is in Section 3.5.
3.1 Parameterization
A model period corresponds to one quarter. Since we focus on evaluating the implications
of an asset market friction, we set the parameters governing preferences to values commonly
used in international macro models. We set the discount factor β = 0.99 and the coefficient
of relative risk aversion η = 2. We set the elasticity of substitution σ between traded and
non-traded goods to 0.5, and we set the share a on traded goods in consumption so that the
fraction of expenditures on traded goods is 50%. These are both close to the estimates in
Stockman and Tesar (1995).
We choose the distributions of fixed transfer costs and idiosyncratic income shocks to
13
match statistics on income and consumption inequality and asset market activity in the US.
Since our model assumes a time-invariant cross-sectional variance of income, we pick average
measures of inequality in the US Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) over 1980Q1 −
2003Q4.10 Using CEX data from Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010), we estimate residual
variances of quarterly income and consumption unexplained by household characteristics.
We regress income and consumption on the following characteristics of the reference person:
sex, race, education, experience (proxied by age), interaction terms between experience and
education, and dummies for region of residence, following Krueger and Perri (2006). From
1980Q1 to 2003Q4, these characteristics explain, on average, about 23 percent of the cross-
sectional variance of income and consumption. The variance of the log residual income is
0.37, so we choose the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks in the model to be lognormal with
mean 1 and variance of log income of 0.37.
We set the fraction of assetholders to ω = 0.83, which is equal to the average fraction of
households that report positive financial wealth in the CEX data for 1980-2003. Previous
empirical studies focusing on specific classes of assets have shown that only a fraction of
households own stocks and bonds. For example, Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a) shows that only
20 percent of households hold stocks, while 30 percent hold bonds. Taking into account
indirect stock holding through pension funds and IRAs, Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) cal-
culate that 37 percent of households hold stocks.11 Our larger number comes from inferring
assetholding status based on the presence of financial income rather than direct reports of
assetholdings. We consider sensitivity of the results to other values of ω in Appendix A.5.
Varying the distribution of fixed costs among assetholders fγ(γ) allows us to match a
given cross-sectional variance of consumption and fraction of active households. In the
CEX, the variance of consumption unexplained by household characteristics is, on average,
0.23. Vissing-Jørgensen (2002b) calculates that between 29% and 53% of US households
adjust their holdings of risky assets each year. A very low mean value of γ implies that most
households are active in any period, and hence the variance of consumption is close to zero,
while a very high mean value of γ means that few households are active, so that the variance
of consumption approaches the variance of income. Holding fixed the mean of γ, increasing
the dispersion of the distribution lowers the variance of log consumption while increasing
the fraction of households that are active. Holding fixed the variance of γ, increasing the
mean raises the variance of log consumption while lowering the fraction of households active.
We choose the distribution of γ to be lognormal, and we choose its mean and variance so
10Appendix A.4 contains details on the microdata.
11Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a) uses the US Consumer Expenditure Survey for 1980-1996, and Haliassos and
Bertaut (1995) use the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances.
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that in the steady state, the model’s variance of log consumption equals 0.23 and 40% of
asset-holding households are active annually.12 The parameters of fγ imply that the average
fixed cost is 0.981 and the standard deviation is 0.651.
The stochastic process of shocks is given by a first order vector autoregressive process:
log sˆt+1 = A log sˆt + εt+1 (23)
where sˆt = [YˆTt, YˆNt, µˆt, Yˆ
∗
Tt, Yˆ
∗
Nt, µˆ
∗
t ]
′ denotes deviations of the exogenous state variables
from their long-run averages, [Y¯T , Y¯N , µ¯t, Y¯
∗
T , Y¯
∗
t , µ¯
∗
t ]
′. A is a 6× 6 matrix of coefficients, and
εt ∼ N(0,Σ). We estimate a symmetric version of equation (23) on data from the US and a
trade-weighted aggregate of 21 OECD countries. We use annual data from the OECD STAN
database for 1988 − 2015 on GDP of the manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and utilities
sectors for YT , and the remainder (services and construction) for YN . We use data on M1
from the OECD Main Economic Indicators to calculate money growth µ for the same period.
Imposing symmetry means:
A =
[
A1 A2
A2 A1
]
and Σ =
[
Σ1 Σ2
Σ2 Σ1
]
(24)
where A1 and A2 are each 3× 3 matrices and Σ1 and Σ2 are each 3× 3 symmetric matrices.
The estimated values for A are:
A1 =
 0.306 −0.047 −0.0330.152 0.469 0.020
−0.135 −0.176 0.353
 , A2 =
 0.001 −0.004 −0.0140.011 −0.061 0.142
0.365 −0.391 −0.055

and for Σ,
Σ1 = 10
−4 ×
 6.892 2.287 −2.4132.287 1.176 −1.160
−2.413 −1.160 8.198
 , Σ2 = 10−4 ×
 3.842 1.360 −3.1101.360 4.884 −6.969
−3.110 −6.969 2.008

In our symmetric two-country economy, we set Y¯T = Y¯
∗
T = 1 and Y¯N = Y¯
∗
N = 1 and
µ¯ = µ¯∗ = 1.04, which is the average money growth factor for the US in our sample period.
We adjust the annual estimates to make them quarterly as in Edmond and Veldkamp (2009).
12A household is inactive for one year with probability (1 − ωm¯A)4, where m¯A is the mass of active
households each quarter on average in the steady state. So the implied value of m¯A is
1−0.61/4
ω = 0.144.
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3.2 International Risk Sharing Through the Lens of the Model
We show that the model generates high risk sharing when measured using asset prices and
low risk sharing when measured using aggregate consumption. In addition, the correlation
between the real exchange rate and the ratio of consumption across countries is negative.
The asset price-based risk sharing measures in Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006)
are constructed from stochastic discount factors (SDFs) inferred from data on real domestic
and international equity returns. To construct a similar measure in our model, we first
construct real equity and risk-free returns that satisfy the Euler equation for an active
household in each country, then we recover the SDF that prices these assets using the Hansen
and Jagannathan (1991) approach. In our complete markets environment, equity and risk-
free bonds are redundant assets, so introducing them does not change the allocation.
The real equity index in the home country pays a dividend equal to nt, the real value of the
aggregate endowment. The real equity price vt and the real risk-free price v
rf
t , denominated
in units of consumption, satisfy the following Euler equations:
vt = βEt
u′(CAt+1)
u′(CAt)
(vt+1 + nt+1) (25)
vrft = βEt
u′(CAt+1)
u′(CAt)
(26)
where for ease of notation, we drop the history dependence.13 The risk-free return is denoted
Rrft =
1
vrft
. For the foreign country, v∗t , v
rf∗
t , and R
rf∗
t are defined analogously. For each
country, we construct returns on three risky assets: domestic equity, international equity,
and an international bond. In the home country, these returns are:
Rdt+1 =
vt+1 + nt+1
vt
Rit+1 =
xt+1
xt
v∗t+1 + n
∗
t+1
v∗t
Rxt+1 =
xt+1
xt
Rrf∗t
13Appendix A.2 contains the numerical details of how we solve equations (25) and (26).
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In the foreign country, the three returns are:
R∗dt+1 =
v∗t+1 + n
∗
t+1
v∗t
R∗it+1 =
xt
xt+1
vt+1 + nt+1
vt
R∗xt+1 =
xt
xt+1
Rrft
Following Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006), we apply the Hansen and Jagannathan
(1991) construction to the vector of simulated excess returns on the three assets—e.g. in the
home country, Ret+1 = [Rdt+1 −Rrft , Rit+1 −Rrft , Rxt+1 −Rrft ]′. The minimum-variance SDF
that prices these excess returns is
mt+1 =
1
Rrft
− 1
Rrft
E[Ret+1]Σ
−1
e (R
e
t+1 − E[Ret+1]) (27)
where Σe is the covariance matrix of the excess returns. In equation (27), E[·] denotes the
sample mean of a simulated series. We define the foreign SDF m∗t+1 analogously.
Table 1 presents results for our benchmark model, and for two alternative market struc-
tures: a frictionless, complete markets model with all households active, and a segmented
markets model with no trade in goods. We report risk sharing statistics based on three
different series: all households’ consumption, active households’ consumption, and the SDF
computed from (27). In addition to cross-country correlations, we report a risk sharing index
developed by Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) given in equation (28) and labeled
BCS risk sharing index in the table.
1− var(mt+1 −m
∗
t+1)
var(mt+1) + var(m∗t+1)
(28)
In equation (28), mt+1 is either the SDF from equation (27), the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution (MRS) for active home households (i.e., βt (CAt+1/CAt)
−η), or the in-
tertemporal MRS for aggregate home consumption (i.e., βt (Ct+1/Ct)
−η), while m∗t+1 is the
analogue for the foreign country. The numerator of the fraction in equation (28) measures
how much risk is not shared across countries, while the denominator measures how much
risk there is to share. The index lies between −1 and 1, and measures how far countries are
from perfect risk sharing, corresponding to an index value of 1 when mt+1 = m
∗
t+1.
The first column of Table 1 contains our benchmark model results, showing a substantial
difference between asset price-based measures of risk sharing and the measures based on
aggregate consumption. The first five rows report volatilies, showing that the real exchange
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Table 1: Results from Benchmark Model and Alternative Environments
Asset Market Segmentation
Endogenous
Benchmark
No trade
in goods
Exogenous
Frictionless
complete
markets
Standard Deviation (%)
Real exchange rate 1.17 4.14 1.49 0.57
Real income 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Aggregate consumption 0.93 0.87 0.84 0.68
Active consumption 0.94 1.37 1.34 0.68
SDF 5.64 4.74 4.79 5.57
Int’l Correlations
Real income 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
Aggregate consumption 0.32 0.52 0.27 0.91
Active consumption 0.81 −0.14 0.84 0.91
SDF 0.85 0.17 0.65 0.94
BCS Risk Sharing Index
Aggregate consumption 0.47 0.62 0.40 0.95
Active consumption 0.77 −0.28 0.83 0.95
SDF 0.97 0.22 0.84 0.99
Correlation C
C∗ and x −0.79 −0.30 −0.83 1.00
Notes: Statistics are Hodrick-Prescott filtered, logged, and averaged over 10000 simulations of 800 quarters.
SDF refers to stochastic discount factors.
rate in the benchmark model is more volatile than real income, aggregate and active con-
sumption have similar volatilies, and the SDF that prices equity and international bonds
is more volatile than either consumption measure. Although the true stochastic discount
factor in the model is the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for active households,
the SDF constructed from (27) is more volatile because the set of assets it prices is very
restricted compared to the complete asset markets of the model. Nevertheless, the interna-
tional correlations of the SDF and active consumption are similar—0.85 and 0.81—and are
higher than the correlation of aggregate consumption, at 0.32. The BCS index also shows
that risk sharing measured from asset prices is higher than when measured from aggregate
consumption (0.97 vs. 0.47). Using data from the US, UK, and Japan, Brandt, Cochrane,
and Santa-Clara (2006) show that their risk sharing index based on asset prices is around
0.99, while the analogue of the index constructed from aggregate consumption data is in the
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range 0.3−0.4, and we show in Table 2 that the average bilateral correlation of consumption
across G7 countries is 0.27. Thus, our model is successful in generating high risk sharing
based on asset prices and low risk sharing based on aggregate consumption.
Table 2: Aggregate Consumption Correlations and Consumption-Real Ex-
change Rate Correlations in G7 Data
Aggregate Consumption Correlations, corr(C,C∗)
France Germany Italy UK Canada Japan
US 0.32 0.28 0.02 0.45 0.60 0.25
France 0.38 0.45 0.31 0.21 0.35
Germany 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.18
Italy 0.17 0.15 0.13
UK 0.42 0.37
Canada 0.12
Average consumption correlation = 0.27
Consumption-real exchange rate correlations, corr( C
C∗ , RER)
France Germany Italy U.K. Canada Japan
US 0 −0.03 −0.12 −0.34 −0.08 0.23
France 0.05 0.15 −0.12 −0.05 0.12
Germany 0.10 −0.11 −0.05 0.05
Italy −0.13 −0.03 0.04
UK −0.02 −0.20
Canada 0.05
Average consumption-real exchange rate correlation = −0.02
Notes: G7 data from the OECD spans 1960Q1−2015Q4. Consumption data are private final consumption
expenditures from the OECD Quarterly National Accounts. Consumption is expressed per population ages
15 − 64, from United Nations, World Population Prospects. Consumption-real exchange rate correlations
are between bilateral real exchange rates and bilateral relative consumption for the seven countries. Real
exchange rates (RER) are computed using nominal exchange rates and consumer price indices from OECD
Main Economic Indicators. Consumption and real exchange rates are logged and Hodrick-Prescott filtered.
Our model also resolves the Backus-Smith-Kollmann puzzle as the correlation between the
real exchange rate and the cross-country ratio of aggregate consumption in the benchmark
model is negative, at −0.79, significantly lower than 1 (see the last row of Table 1), and
consistent with the prevalence of negative values observed in G7 data (see Table 2). In
the next subsection, we explore the mechanisms that transmit international risk sharing to
aggregate consumption and that explain why the ratio of aggregate consumption is negatively
correlated with the real exchange rate.
In the second column of Table 1, we consider an alternative goods market structure, with
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no international trade in goods, as in AAK02. With no trade in goods, the order of the risk
sharing measures is flipped: for example, aggregate consumption is more correlated across
countries than active consumption or the SDFs. The correlation of aggregate consumption is
essentially the same as that of aggregate income, since aggregate consumption is constrained
by domestic resources; since monetary shocks reallocate consumption between active and in-
active households, active consumption moves opposite to aggregate consumption, generating
a slightly negative cross-country correlation in active consumption.
In the third column of Table 1, we report results from a version of the model with
exogenously segmented asset markets. We assume that a constant fraction of households is
always active, equal to the steady state fraction of active households in the benchmark model,
m¯A =
∫
[Fy (y¯L(γ)) + 1− Fy (y¯H(γ))] fγ(γ)dγ, and the remainder are always inactive. This
model is similar to Kollmann (2012)’s model with “hand-to-mouth” consumers. The patterns
in the table are essentially the same as the benchmark model. In section 3.3, we show how
aggregate consumption risk sharing in our benchmark model is affected by the endogenous
movements in the set of active households, and in section 3.4 we show that the endogenously
segmented model is consistent with cross-sectional data on inflation and consumption risk
sharing, while the exogenous model is not. For this reason, the endogenously segmented
markets model better fits the data on international risk sharing.
The last column of Table 1 displays the results from the frictionless complete markets
model. This model is consistent with a high degree of risk sharing implied by asset prices in
the data, but inconsistent with a low degree of risk sharing implied by aggregate consumption
data. Since all households are active in this model, the risk sharing equation (21) applies to
aggregate consumption, and the correlation between the real exchange rate and the ratio of
aggregate consumption across countries is equal to one.
3.3 The Role of Endogenous Asset Market Segmentation
The quantitative results in Table 1 show that active consumption is highly correlated across
countries, and equation (21) implies that the ratio of active households’ consumption across
countries is perfectly correlated with the real exchange rate. In this section, we illustrate how
traded, non-traded, and monetary shocks interact with endogenous asset market segmenta-
tion to generate positive comovement in aggregate consumption and a negative consumption-
real exchange rate correlation.
We can write aggregate consumption in period t, from equation (22) as:
Ct = ωmAtCAt +
nt
µt
(ωyIt + 1− ω) (29)
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where mAt =
∫
[Fy (yLt(γ)) + 1− Fy (yHt(γ))] fγ(γ)dγ is the mass of active assetholders and
yIt =
∫ ∫ yHt(γ)
yLt(γ)
yfy(y)dyfγ(γ)dγ is the fraction of income held by inactive assetholders.
In Appendix A.3, we show that, to a first-order approximation near a symmetric steady
state, changes in relative consumption across countries are given by:
Cˆt − Cˆ∗t = (φI + φNA)
[
ψT (YˆTt − Yˆ ∗Tt) + ψN(YˆNt − Yˆ ∗Nt)− µˆt + µˆ∗t
]
(30)
+ φI [yˆIt − yˆ∗It] + φA
[
1
η
xˆt + mˆAt − mˆ∗At
]
where all variables with hats are log deviations from the steady state, e.g., Cˆt = log
Ct
C¯
. We
refer to the left hand side as relative aggregate consumption growth. Here, φA = ω
m¯AC¯A
C¯
is
active assetholders’ steady state share of consumption, φI = ω
n¯
µ¯C¯
y¯I is inactive assetholders’
steady state share of consumption, and φNA = 1− φA − φI is non-assetholders’ steady state
share of consumption. The constants ψT and ψN are the steady state expenditure shares on
traded and non-traded goods.
We use equation (30) to illustrate the effects of shocks to traded and non-traded output
and money growth on relative aggregate consumption growth. The first two terms are the
contribution of households not participating in asset markets in period t. If all households
were either always inactive, φI = 1, or non-assetholders, φNA = 1, then yˆIt = yˆ
∗
It = 0, and
relative aggregate consumption growth would simply reflect relative traded and non-traded
income growth, weighted by the appropriate consumption expenditure shares, and relative
money growth, i.e. Cˆt−Cˆ∗t = ψT (YˆTt−Yˆ ∗Tt)+ψN(YˆNt−Yˆ ∗Nt)−µˆt+µˆ∗t . On the other extreme, if
all households were always active assetholders, then φA = 1 and mˆAt = mˆ
∗
At = 0, and relative
aggregate consumption growth would be perfectly correlated with the real exchange rate,
reflecting perfect cross-country risk sharing, i.e. Cˆt − Cˆ∗t = 1η xˆt.
Asset market segmentation has two effects on consumption risk sharing relative to either
of these two extremes. First, relative aggregate consumption growth is a weighted average
of contributions from active and inactive households, so it is not perfectly correlated with
the real exchange rate. This is true even with exogenous market segmentation, in which case
equation (30) is Cˆt − Cˆ∗t = (φI + φNA)[ψT (YˆTt − Yˆ ∗Tt) + ψN(YˆNt − Yˆ ∗Nt)− µˆt + µˆ∗t ] + φA 1η xˆt.
Second, with endogenously segmented markets, movements in the fraction of active house-
holds and the average income of inactive households have additional effects that reinforce
risk sharing. We illustrate these effects through impulse responses to 1% shocks to home
country traded and non-traded output and home country money growth. The impulse re-
sponses are plotted in Figures 1 - 3. For this analysis, we set the off-diagonal elements of
the matrix A to zero, to isolate the effects of each shock in the absence of spillovers to other
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shocks. Impulse responses incorporating these spillovers are shown in Appendix A.5, and
reflect similar patterns as Figures 1 - 3.
Figure 1: Impulse responses to 1% increase in home country traded output, YT
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First, consider the responses to a positive shock to home country traded output, YT , in
Figure 1. The upper-left panel shows home country active and aggregate consumption, CAt
and Ct. In response to the shock, all households have higher income, but active households
smooth by saving, so their consumption rises less than aggregate consumption. In the foreign
country, active households’ consumption increases by more than aggregate consumption,
because they borrow from home households, while inactive households’ consumption doesn’t
move (upper-right panel). Therefore, relative aggregate consumption growth and relative
active consumption growth move in opposite directions (lower-left panel). A shock to traded
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output generates a negative correlation in relative aggregate consumption growth and the
real exchange rate, corr
(
C
C∗ , x
)
< 0, but cross-country comovement in aggregate consumption
that is similar to the comovement of active consumption.
The lower-right panel of Figure 1 shows the effects of changes in the set of active and
inactive households. The fraction of households active in the foreign country rises more than
in the home country, because foreign households have the most to gain from sharing the
shock to home country output. In addition, the income of inactive households goes down
in the home country relative to foreign country, because high-income home households who
want to save become active, while poor foreign households become active to borrow. These
two movements reinforce the risk sharing apparent in aggregate consumption, pulling relative
aggregate consumption in the same direction as relative active consumption, as can be seen
in equation (30). Overall however, the impact on the consumption of inactive households
dominates these effects: a large fraction of home households must consume their additional
income while the price of non-traded goods is rising, so Cˆt− Cˆ∗t rises while xˆt falls, inducing
a negative correlation between relative aggregate consumption and the real exchange rate.
Next, in Figure 2 we plot the responses to a positive shock to home country non-traded
output, YN . Active households would like to smooth by lending to foreign households, but
the increased non-traded endowment must all be consumed domestically. So active and
aggregate consumption move closely together (upper-left panel), foreign consumption does
not move (upper-right panel), and relative aggregate and relative active consumption growth
are both positively correlated with the real exchange rate (lower-left panel). Since CA rises
much more than C∗A, mA/m
∗
A increases (lower-right panel). The income of inactive home
households moves relatively little, because there are greater numbers of both borrowers and
lenders. Here again, movements in the relative fractions of active households in each country,
i.e., mA/m
∗
A, reinforce risk sharing (see equation 30). Overall, a shock to non-traded income
generates low cross-country comovement in consumption and a positive correlation in relative
aggregate consumption and the real exchange rate.
Finally, Figure 3 plots the responses to a positive shock to home country money growth,
µ. An increase in money growth reallocates resources from inactive to active households
(upper-left panel), as inflation reduces the real value of inactive households’ money balances
while active households benefit from the money injection. Active home households lend more
abroad, so that C∗A rises while foreign inactive households’ consumption doesn’t change,
so C∗ rises less than C∗A (upper-right panel). As a result, relative aggregate consumption
moves opposite to relative active consumption, and the correlation between relative aggregate
consumption and the real exchange rate is negative (lower-left panel). The lower-right panel
of the figure shows that the effects of endogenous segmentation are roughly opposite to
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to 1% increase in home country non-traded output, YN
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those in response to a traded output shock in figure 1: home households have a greater
incentive to become active to avoid the effects of inflation, so mA/m
∗
A increases. Since
money growth reduces real money balances, marginal inactive households become active,
while marginal active households become inactive. This increases average income of inactive
home households, yI , so yI/y
∗
I rises. As in the case of the shock to YT , these changes in
the composition of active households in response to a money growth shock mitigate the
divergence between relative aggregate consumption and relative active consumption, as seen
in equation (30). A monetary shock leads to a negative correlation between relative aggregate
consumption growth and the real exchange rate, but generates a negative correlation in
aggregate consumption.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to 1% increase in home country money growth, µ
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3.4 Suggestive Evidence for Model Mechanisms
The decomposition in equation (30) and the impulse responses in the lower-right panels of
Figures 1 - 3 illustrate two effects of incorporating endogenously segmented asset markets.
First, active households’ consumption reflects better risk sharing than inactive households’
consumption, and the same is true of assetholders’ consumption and non-assetholders’ con-
sumption. Second, endogenous segmentation has an offsetting effect on international risk
sharing that is not present in models with exogenously segmented asset markets, such as
Kollmann (2012). Monetary shocks, in particular, affect the incentive to actively participate
in asset markets, and equilibrium movements in the fraction of active households increase
the degree of international risk sharing apparent in aggregate consumption, leading to a
25
stronger relationship between relative aggregate consumption and the real exchange rate. A
related prediction of the model is that an increase in the average money growth rate raises
the fraction of households active on average, and thereby increases aggregate consumption
risk sharing.
In this section, we provide suggestive evidence that is consistent with these two impli-
cations. We first look at micro data to evaluate international risk sharing across different
groups of households, and then we turn to aggregate cross-country data to illustrate the
relationship between average inflation and aggregate consumption risk sharing.
3.4.1 International Risk Sharing in Microdata
The model’s prediction that international risk sharing for assetholders is better than for
non-assetholders is borne out in US and UK survey data over the period 1980-2003. To fully
test the cross-country risk sharing implications of endogenously segmented asset markets,
we would need to identify households actively accessing assets, which would require panel
data at a high frequency on assetholders’ consumption, income, and asset holdings for two or
more countries. Since we do not have such data, we instead compare the model’s predictions
for average consumption among assetholders and non-assetholders to analogous averages
constructed from micro data. The data are described in Appendix A.4.
Table 3: Cross-country Consumption Correlations in US and UK Surveys
US and UK Data Benchmark Model
Aggregate consumption 0.08 0.32
assetholders’ consumption 0.30 0.38
Non-assetholders’ consumption 0.03 0.25
Notes: The table reports correlations of Hodrick-Prescott filtered log non-durable annual consumption over
1980 − 2003. US data are from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and UK data are from Family
Expenditure Survey (FES). See Appendix A.4 for further description of the data.
Table 3 reports statistics from the micro data and from the benchmark model. The first
column of the table shows that the correlation between aggregate nondurable consumption
in the US and UK is 0.08. Assetholders’ consumption comoves more strongly across the US
and UK than the aggregate, with a correlation of 0.30, while non-assetholders’ consumption
is essentially uncorrelated. The ranking of these correlations is consistent with the model
results: assetholders’ consumption is more highly correlated than non-assetholders’, as shown
in the second column of the table.
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The aggregate consumption correlation from micro data provided in Table 3 is signifi-
cantly lower that the one computed from national accounts data. Indeed, in Table 2, we
show that over the period 1960Q1 to 2015Q4, HP-filtered US and UK aggregate consump-
tion have a correlation of 0.45. If we restrict the time period to 1980 − 2003 as in the
survey data we use, the correlation changes to 0.44. The discrepancy between the measures
of consumption from survey data and from national accounts for the US and the UK has
been previously acknowledged in the literature. Krueger et al. (2010) document that in both
the US CEX as well as the UK FES per capita consumption growth is significantly slower
than the corresponding national accounts measures. Our focus on US and UK data is driven
solely by the availability of financial assets variables which allow us to measure consumption
for assetholders and non-assetholders. Our findings for the US and UK suggest that doc-
umenting differences in international risk sharing among assetholders and non-assetholders
across more countries is a promising avenue for future empirical work.
3.4.2 Inflation and International Risk Sharing in Aggregate Data
We highlight the model’s prediction that higher average inflation leads to higher measures
of risk sharing, and provide novel cross-country evidence for this implication. We also show
that the relationship between average inflation and international risk sharing in a version of
our model with exogenously segmented asset markets is far weaker.
Figure 4: Consumption-Real Exchange Rate Correlation and Inflation in
Model with Endogenous and Exogenous Asset Market Segmentation
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
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In Figure 4, the solid line plots the correlation between relative aggregate consumption
and the real exchange rate across levels of average inflation (i.e. the time series average of
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log Pt+1
Pt
) in the benchmark model with endogenous market segmentation. To construct this
figure, we solve the model for different levels of the steady state money growth rate, µ¯, holding
fixed the rest of the calibrated parameters. Average money growth translates one-for-one
into average inflation. As average money growth increases, the fraction of households active
in the steady state increases, since the cost of inactivity rises as higher inflation reduces
the value of inherited money balances. The dotted line in Figure 4 is from a version of
the model in which we fix the fraction of households that are active equal to the calibrated
model’s steady state value, m¯A =
∫
[Fy (y¯L(γ)) + 1− Fy (y¯H(γ))] fγ(γ)dγ. In the model with
an exogenous fraction of households active, average money growth has little effect on the
extent of risk-sharing.
We turn to cross-country data to document a novel fact: higher inflation is associated
with better international risk sharing. In Figure 5, we show that high-inflation countries have
higher correlations between their real exchange rates and the ratio of aggregate consumption
relative to the US. The left panel of the figure plots the consumption-real exchange rate
correlations against mean inflation using HP filtered data for 86 countries.14 The right panel
plots the same points, minus four outliers with very high inflation, to verify that the pattern
is not driven by these very high inflation countries. Both plots suggest a strong positive
relationship between average inflation and the consumption-real exchange rate correlation.
We confirm the statistical significance of this relationship in Table 4, which shows the
results from a cross-section regression of the consumption-real exchange rate correlation on
average inflation. The first column is for all 86 countries, while the second column removes
the four outliers. Removing the outliers in fact strengthens the relationship, raising the
slope from 0.576 to 0.949. While our model is a symmetric two-country world rather than
a cross-section of asymmetric countries as in the data, our results indicate that there is a
significant relationship between average inflation and international risk sharing in the data,
14We use data on nominal exchange rates with the US, consumer price indices (CPI) and household
final consumption expenditures from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset for
86 countries over 1960 − 2017. We list the countries included in our analysis by regions, as defined by the
World Bank: Europe and Central Asia (Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom), South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka),
East Asia and Pacific (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Macao, Malaysia, New Zealand, Phillippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam), Latin America and
Carribean (Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay,
Venezuela), North America (Canada, United States), Middle-East (Israel), and Sub-Saharan Africa (South
Africa). We also construct a data point for the Euro Area starting 1999, using the WDI data for the nominal
exchange rate and the CPI, and an aggregate of household consumption over the constituent countries.
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Figure 5: Consumption-Real Exchange Rate Correlation and Inflation
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Notes: Data are from the World Development Indicators dataset published by the World Bank. For each
country, we compute the correlation between the (HP filtered) log real exchange rate with the US and the
(HP filtered) log consumption per capita differences to the US, using annual data for 1960 − 2017. We
restrict the sample to years when all data—the nominal exchange rate with the US, the consumer price
index (CPI) and the household final consumption expenditures—are available in a given country. We plot
the consumption-real exchange rate correlation against mean log gross CPI inflation. The 4 countries marked
by diamonds in panel (a) are (reading from left to right along the x-axis): Peru, Ukraine, Belarus, and Brazil
and are excluded from panel (b). The full list of countries is provided in footnote 14.
and that a model with endogenously segmented markets model is better able to account for
this finding than a model with exogenous asset market segmentation.
Our empirical result is similar in spirit to Bansal and Dahlquist (2000)’s findings, namely
that deviations from uncovered interest parity (UIP) are smaller between the US and coun-
tries with high inflation compared to countries with low inflation. While the UIP relationship
deals only with relative prices (the nominal exchange rate and the interest rate differential),
our focus is on the relationship between a relative price (the real exchange rate) and quanti-
ties (relative aggregate consumption). Bansal and Dahlquist note that their finding could be
interpreted as evidence of segmented markets. Our model results confirm this interpretation
in the context of the consumption-real exchange rate relationship.
3.5 Welfare Gains from International Risk Sharing
In this section, we show that our model is consistent with the finding in Lewis (2000) that
welfare gains from international financial markets measured using asset prices are higher
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Table 4: Consumption-Real Exchange Rate Correlation Regressions
(1) (2)
Average inflation 0.576 0.949
(0.237) (0.377)
Constant −0.104 −0.136
(0.040) (0.047)
Number of countries 86 82
R2 0.066 0.073
Notes: All coefficient estimates are statistically significant at 0.05 level. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Regression (1) uses data from 1960 − 2017 for the 86 countries listed in footnote 14, while
regression (2) drops four countries that are outliers in terms of inflation: Belarus, Brazil, Peru and Ukraine.
than estimates based on aggregate consumption data. We use our model to construct three
alternative measure of welfare gains: (i) actual gains based on the ex-ante utility of a
representative household, (ii) active consumption-based gains measured using the utility
of a hypothetical household who is active every period, and (iii) aggregate consumption-
based gains measured using the utility of a hypothetical household who consumes aggregate
consumption each period. We interpret the active consumption-based gains as an asset price-
based measure of welfare since active households price assets in our environment.15 We find
that these active consumption-based welfare gains are an order of magnitude larger than
both the aggregate consumption-based gains and the actual welfare gains.
We consider lifetime consumption-equivalent measures of the gains from international
asset trade relative to financial autarky. To express the weighted average of ex-ante expected
utility across households with different fixed costs, γ, and different assetholding statuses,
we define the per-period average utility of non-assetholders, uNA(s
t), inactive assetholders,
15The actual asset-price based measure in Lewis (2000) measures the change in the present discounted
value of wealth from moving from a diversified portfolio (with constant shares) of domestic and international
equity to one of only domestic equity. Since this calculation departs significantly from our framework, we
instead use active households’ utility directly as a measure of asset market-based gains.
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uI(s
t), and active assetholders, uA(s
t) as:
uNA(s
t) =
∫ (yt−1 n(st)µt )1−η
1− η fy(yt−1)dyt−1 (31)
uI(s
t) =
∫ ∫ yH(st,γ)
yL(st,γ)
(
yt−1
n(st)
µt
)1−η
1− η fy(yt−1)dyt−1fγ(γ)dγ (32)
uA(s
t) =
∫
mA(s
t, γ)
(CA(s
t))
1−η
1− η fγ(γ)dγ (33)
Then the weighted average ex-ante expected utility is:
W =
∞∑
t=0
∫
βt
[
(1− ω)uNA(st) + ω(uA(st) + uI(st))
]
g(st)dst (34)
To define the actual welfare gain, let W¯ denote the lifetime utility level under international
financial autarky. Then, the actual welfare gain from international financial markets is
given by the factor Γ =
(
W/W¯
)1/(1−η)
, so that 100 × (Γ− 1) is the percentage increase
in consumption each period that all households in financial autarky would need in order
to attain the same weighted average utility level as in the benchmark equilibrium with
international asset trade.
The active consumption-based gains are calculated from the utility of a hypothetical
household who is active every period:
WA =
∞∑
t=0
βt
∫
st
CA(s
t)1−η
1− η g(s
t)dst
Similarly, the aggregate consumption-based gains are calculated from the utility of a hypo-
thetical household who consumes aggregate consumption every period:
WC =
∞∑
t=0
βt
∫
st
C(st)1−η
1− η g(s
t)dst
Denoting W¯A and W¯C the analogues of these two utility levels in financial autarky,
the active consumption-based gains are given by ΓA =
(
WA/W¯A
)1/(1−η)
and the aggregate
consumption-based gains are given by ΓC =
(
WC/W¯C
)1/(1−η)
.
Table 5 reports the welfare gains in both the benchmark model and in the frictionless,
complete markets model for different measures of risk aversion. In the frictionless, complete
markets model, all the measures are the same, and indicate that, if η = 2, international
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Table 5: Welfare Gains in Model: Actual and Consumption-Based
Benchmark
Model
Frictionless
complete markets
η = 2 η = 5 η = 2 η = 5
Welfare gains (in percent)
Actual gains 0.0060 0.0355 0.0031 0.0070
Active consumption-based 0.0428 0.1183 0.0031 0.0070
Aggregate consumption-based 0.0038 0.0043 0.0031 0.0070
Notes: Welfare gains are averaged over 10000 simulations of 800 quarters.
asset trade raises welfare by the equivalent of a 0.0031 percent increase in consumption in
every quarter. In the benchmark model, the actual welfare gains are a bit larger, at 0.0061
percent. Within the benchmark model, we find that welfare gains implied by asset prices are
indeed larger than welfare gains implied by aggregate consumption, by an order of magnitude
(0.0428% vs. 0.0038%). In addition, these results indicate that the aggregate consumption-
based measure of welfare gains is much closer to the actual welfare gains from international
asset trade than the measure based on active consumption. Table 5 also reports results for a
higher value of risk aversion, η = 5, which magnifies welfare gains and the difference between
the aggregate consumption measure and the active consumption measure.
4 Conclusions
We extend the segmented asset markets model of Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002) to
incorporate real shocks and trade in goods, and show that it is successful in resolving the
puzzling observation that asset prices imply a high degree of international risk sharing,
while aggregate consumption suggests a low degree of risk sharing (as documented in Brandt,
Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006)). While asset market segmentation in principle breaks the
link between aggregate consumption and asset prices, our contribution is in quantitatively
evaluating this mechanism in a calibrated model. We illustrate how traded shocks, non-
traded shocks, and monetary shocks move the ratios of relative aggregate consumption and
relative active consumption in opposite directions, generating high risk sharing implied by
asset prices but low risk sharing implied by aggregate consumption. Evidence from microdata
in the US and UK supports our model’s implication that assetholders’ consumption is more
highly correlated across countries than non-assetholders’ consumption.
Our model provides a resolution to the puzzle highlighted by Backus and Smith (1993)
and Kollmann (1995), by generating a negative correlation between the cross-country ratio of
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aggregate consumption and the real exchange rate. Endogenously segmented asset markets
generate a consumption-real exchange rate correlation that rises with average inflation, and
we show that this is consistent with cross-country evidence.
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional detail on model setup and characterization
A.1.1 Intermediary’s problem
The intermediary’s profits in state st are∫ ∫ ∫ ∫ [
q(st, st+1, y
t−1, yt)B(st, st+1, yt−1, yt, γ)+
e(st)q∗(st, st+1, yt−1, yt)B∗(st, st+1, yt−1, yt, γ)
]
fy(y
t−1)fγ(γ)dst+1dytdyt−1dγ
− q(st, st+1)B(st, st+1)− e(st)q∗(st, st+1)B∗(st, st+1)
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where q(st, st+1) and q
∗(st, st+1) are prices of government debt, i.e. the prices of state-
contingent claims to one unit of each currency in the next period. The intermediary max-
imizes these profits subject to the constraint that at every state st+1, the total value of
payments to households equals the interest payments received on government debt,∫ ∫ ∫ [
B(st+1, yt, γ) + e(st+1)B∗(st+1, yt, γ)
]
fy(y
t)fγ(γ)dy
tdγ
= B(st, st+1) + e(s
t+1)B∗(st, st+1)
The first order conditions of the intermediary’s problem yield the no-arbitrage conditions
in the text, equations (11)-(13).
A.1.2 Details on characterization of equilibrium
With complete asset markets, a household’s sequence of asset market budget constraints
collapses to a single date-0 budget. Let Q(st) = q(s0, s1)q(s
1, s2) · · · q(st−1, st) denote the
date-0 price of a dollar at state st. Using the no-arbitrage condition (11), the sequence of
budget constraints for home households (4) with fixed cost γ can be written:
∞∑
t=0
∫ ∫
Q(st)fy(y
t−1)z(st, yt−1, γ)τ(st, yt−1, γ)dstdyt−1 ≤ Bh0(γ) + e0Bf0(γ) (35)
A household’s problem is then to choose consumption, C(st, yt−1, γ), transfer decisions
z(st, yt−1, γ), and transfers τ(st, yt−1, γ) to maximize expected utility (6) subject to the date-
0 budget constraint (35) and the cash-in-advance constraint (1). As in Alvarez, Atkeson,
and Kehoe (2009), we assume that Bh0(γ) and Bf0(γ) are chosen so that households all have
the same Lagrange multiplier on the date-0 budget constraint (35) in this maximization
problem.
The first order conditions for C(st, yt−1, γ) and τ(st, yt−1, γ), in states when z(st, yt−1, γ) =
1, yield:
βtU ′
(
C(st, yt−1, γ)
)
g(st) = P (st)λQ(st) (36)
where λ is the multiplier on the date-0 budget constraint. Equation (36) shows that
C(st, yt−1, γ) is independent of yt−1 if z(st, yt−1, γ) = 1. That is, idiosyncratic risk is pooled
among all active households, and they all consume the same level, CA(s
t).
If a household chooses z(st, yt−1, γ) = 0, then its consumption is the same as that of a
non-assetholder, CI(s
t, yt−1), defined in the text in equation (19).
Now, we consider the choice of whether to transfer into or out of the asset market account.
If z(st, yt−1, γ) = 1, then using the goods market budget constraint (1), the amount trans-
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ferred is: τ(st, yt−1, γ) = P (st) (CA(st) + γ − CI(st, yt−1)). We can then write the house-
hold’s problem as:
max
∞∑
t=0
∫ ∫
βt
[
z(st, yt−1, γ)U(CA(st))
+
(
1− z(st, yt−1, γ))U (yt−1n(st)
µt
)]
g(st)fy(y
t−1)dstdyt−1
subject to:
∞∑
t=0
∫ ∫
Q(st)fy(y
t−1)z(st, yt−1, γ)P (st)
[
CA(s
t) + γ − yt−1n(s
t)
µt
]
dstdyt−1
≤ Bh0(γ) + e0Bf0(γ)
In the Lagrangian of this problem, the value in state (st, yt−1) of setting z(st, yt−1, γ) = 1 is
given by:
βtU
(
CA(s
t)
)
g(st)fy(y
t−1)− λQ(st)fy(yt−1)P (st)
[
CA(s
t) + γ − yt−1n(s
t)
µt
]
(37)
And the value of setting z(st, yt−1, γ) = 0 is:
βtU
(
yt−1
n(st)
µt
)
g
(
st
)
f
(
yt
)
(38)
Lastly, the value of λ is from the first order condition when z(st, yt−1, γ) = 1, equation (36).
The net gain of setting z(st, yt−1, γ) = 1 versus setting z(st, yt−1, γ) = 0—the difference
between expressions (37) and (38)—is positive whenever:
U
(
CA(s
t)
)− U (yt−1n(st)
µt
)
− U ′ (CA(st)) [CA (st)+ γ − yt−1n(st)
µt
]
> 0 (39)
which leads to the definition of the function h in (20) in the text.
An equilibrium allocation is characterized by active household consumption levels and
cutoffs determining the set of active households in each country. All equilibrium variables
depend only on the current realization of st = (YTt, YNt, µt, Y
∗
Tt, Y
∗
Nt, µ
∗
t ) and not on its
history. Given a vector of shocks st, we use the risk sharing condition (21); the demand
functions (2)-(3) and their foreign analogues; the goods market clearing conditions (14)-(15)
and the foreign analogue; and the conditions h(yL(s
t, γ)) = h(yH(s
t, γ)) = h(y∗L(s
t, γ)) =
h(y∗H(s
t, γ)) = 0 to solve for the active consumption levels, the thresholds for households
to make transfers, and equilibrium prices. In practice, we solve for the equilibrium decision
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rules on a grid of st values and interpolate them. The next subsection provides more detail
on the computation. We solve for an equilibrium in which all home and foreign households
are identical in period 0, so that λ = λ∗ in (21).
A.2 Model Solution
In this section, we provide details on the equilibrium conditions and our solution method.
Equilibrium variables in each period solve a static system of equations given the exogenous
shocks. We define prices of traded and non-traded goods relative to the average price index,
pTt =
PTt
Pt
, pNt =
PNt
Pt
, and likewise for the foreign country, p∗Tt =
P ∗Tt
P ∗t
, p∗Nt =
P ∗Nt
P ∗t
. The risk
sharing condition is
xt =
U ′(C∗At)
U ′(CAt)
(40)
where xt = et
P ∗t
Pt
is the real exchange rate. The law of one price for traded goods can be
written as:
xtp
∗
Tt = pTt (41)
The definitions of the home and foreign consumption price indices in terms of the relative
prices pTt, pNt, p
∗
Tt, p
∗
Nt imply:
1 = (aσp1−σTt + (1− a)σp1−σNt )
1
1−σ (42)
1 = (aσ(p∗Tt)
1−σ + (1− a)σ(p∗Nt)1−σ)
1
1−σ (43)
We can the write the market clearing conditions as:
YTt + Y
∗
Tt =
(pTt
a
)−σ ∫ (
mAt(γ)(CAt + γ) +
nt
µt
yIt(γ)
)
fγ(γ)dγ
+
(
p∗Tt
a
)−σ ∫ (
m∗At(γ)(C
∗
At + γ) +
n∗t
µ∗t
y∗It(γ)
)
fγ(γ)dγ (44)
YNt =
(
pNt
1− a
)−σ ∫ (
mAt(γ)(CAt + γ) +
nt
µt
yIt(γ)
)
fγ(γ)dγ (45)
Y ∗Nt =
(
p∗Nt
1− a
)−σ ∫ (
m∗At(γ)(C
∗
At + γ) +
n∗t
µt
y∗It(γ)
)
fγ(γ)dγ (46)
where real aggregate money balances, fractions of households active in each γ group, and
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average incomes of inactive households in each γ group are given by:
nt = pTtYTt + pNtYNt (47)
n∗t = p
∗
TtY
∗
Tt + p
∗
NtY
∗
Nt (48)
mAt(γ) = F (yLt(γ)) + 1− F (yHt(γ)) (49)
m∗At(γ) = F (y
∗
Lt(γ)) + 1− F (y∗Ht(γ)) (50)
yIt(γ) =
∫ yHt(γ)
yLt(γ)
yfy(y)dy (51)
y∗It(γ) =
∫ y∗Ht(γ)
y∗Lt(γ)
yfy(y)dy (52)
The cutoffs yLt(γ), yHt(γ) are the two solutions to the equation:
0 = U(CAt)− U
(
nt
µt
yLt(γ)
)
− U ′(CAt)
(
CAt + γ − nt
µt
yLt(γ)
)
(53)
and y∗Lt(γ), y
∗
Ht(γ) solve the foreign analogue,
0 = U(C∗At)− U
(
n∗t
µ∗t
y∗Lt(γ)
)
− U ′(C∗At)
(
C∗At + γ −
n∗t
µ∗t
y∗Lt(γ)
)
(54)
Given a realization of the state variables, (YTt, YNt, µt, Y
∗
Tt, Y
∗
Nt, µ
∗
t ), we solve the system
of 7 equations (40) through (46) for the 7 variables (CAt, C
∗
At, pTt, p
∗
Tt, pNt, p
∗
Nt, xt), while
defining the variables given in equations (47)-(52) and solving for the cutoffs using equations
(53) and (54).
Given an initial stock of money, M−1, we define the money stock, price level, and nominal
exchange rate in any period t from: Mt = µtMt−1, Pt = Mtµt , and et = xt
Pt
P ∗t
.
There are two steps that deserve additional explanation: computing the integrals and
solving for the cutoffs. We compute the integrals for γ and for y using Gauss-Hermite
quadrature, so we compute each variable that is a function of γ for a discrete grid {γi}. For
each value of γi, we solve for the home cutoffs (and analogously for the foreign cutoffs) using
Newton’s method in one dimension on equation (53) twice, with different initial values each
time. As described in the text, the right hand side of equation (53), which is the function
h(y; st, γ) defined in the text, is convex, has a minimum value below 0 when y = CAt
µt
nt
, and
crosses zero twice. So as long as the initial guess for yLt(γ), say y
0
Lt(γ), satisfies y
0
Lt(γ) < CAt
µt
nt
and h(y0Lt(γ); s
t, γ) > 0 and the initial guess for yHt(γ), say y
0
Ht(γ), satisfies y
0
Ht(γ) > CAt
µt
nt
,
then Newton’s method from these two starting values quickly and reliably converges to two
distinct solutions to equation (53) with yLt(γ) < yHt(γ).
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In solving the model, we use Chebyshev polynomial interpolation to solve for the equi-
librium decision rules on a grid for the state variables and interpolate them. We simulate
sequences of shocks, and then compute the interpolated values of equilibrium variables. We
use 4 grid points for each of the 6 state variables, corresponding to the Chebyshev interpola-
tion nodes for intervals up to 3 standard deviations above and below the steady state value
of each state variable. We interpolate using 3rd degree Chebyshev polynomials. Increasing
the degree of the polynomial approximation or the width of the grid does not change any of
our results.
After having solved for equilibrium variables, we use a collocation method to solve the
asset pricing equations (25) and (26). For each value of the state vector s, letting g(s, ε) =
(I −A) log s¯+A log si + ε denote the vector of possible values next period, and letting pi(ε)
denote the distribution of the vector of innovations, equation (25) states:
v(s)u′(CA(s))− βEε[u′(CA(g(s, ε)))(v(g(s, ε)) + n(g(s, ε)))] = 0 (55)
We solve for the coefficients of the Chebyshev polynomial approximation to the function v
so that equation (55) holds exactly on the grid for s, using Gauss-Hermite quadrature to
compute the expectation over ε. The computation of vrf is analogous.
A.3 Aggregate Consumption Risk Sharing Equation
In this section, we log-linearize the model’s equations around a symmetric steady state, in
order to derive a first order approximation of the cross country differences in the growth
rates of aggregate consumption, i.e., Cˆt − Cˆ∗t , where Cˆt ≡ logCt − log C¯ and C¯ denotes the
steady state level of aggregate consumption in the home country.
Log-linearizing aggregate consumption in the home country, equation (29), we have:
C¯ · Cˆt = ωm¯AC¯A(mˆAt + CˆAt) + ω n¯
µ¯
y¯I(yˆIt + nˆt − µˆt) + (1− ω) n¯
µ¯
(nˆt − µˆt) (56)
From the definition of nt,
n¯nˆt = p¯T Y¯T (pˆTt + YˆTt) + p¯N Y¯N(pˆNt + YˆNt) (57)
We define the steady state traded fraction of income as ψT ≡ p¯T Y¯Tp¯T Y¯T+p¯N Y¯N , the steady state
non-traded fraction of income as ψN ≡ p¯N Y¯Np¯T Y¯T+p¯N Y¯N , the steady state fraction of aggregate
consumption for inactive assetholding households as φI ≡ ω n¯µ¯ y¯IC¯ ; the fraction for active
assetholding households as φA ≡ ω m¯AC¯AC¯ ; and the fraction for nonassetholding households
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as φNA ≡ (1 − ω) n¯µ¯C¯ . From the definition of the price index and the steady state market
clearing conditions (traded and non-traded income shares are equal to expenditure shares in
the steady state),
0 = ψT pˆTt + ψN pˆNt (58)
The log-linear equation becomes:
Cˆt = (φI + φNA)
[
ψT YˆTt + ψN YˆNt − µˆt
]
+ φI yˆIt + φA
[
CˆAt + mˆAt
]
(59)
The log-linearized risk sharing condition (21) is:
xˆt = −η(Cˆ∗At − CˆAt) (60)
Subtracting the analogue for Cˆ∗t from equation (59) and using equation (60) yields equation
(30) in the text for Cˆt − Cˆ∗t .
A.4 Micro Data
We use data from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey provided by Heathcote, Perri,
and Violante (2010)—henceforth HPV—and from the UK Family Expenditure Survey pro-
vided by Blundell and Etheridge (2010). Both datasets are available for download at:
https://www.economicdynamics.org/si-cross-facts/. For the calibration, we estimate resid-
ual variances of income and consumption unexplained by household characteristics, as de-
scribed in Section 3.1, using the “CEX sample b” provided by HPV.
For the statistics in Table 3, for the US we instead use the CEX data from Krueger
and Perri (2006), since it contains information on financial asset holdings. We classify a
household as an asset holder if their financial wealth is positive. We construct aggregate
average nondurable consumption per capita (i.e. per adult equivalent as defined by OECD
equivalence scale) and average consumption per capita for non-assetholders (i.e. households
with zero financial wealth) and assetholders (i.e. households with positive financial wealth).
The UK survey data is annual, so for the US, we aggregate quarterly consumption into an
annual average. We then compute the US−UK correlations of the Hodrick-Prescott filtered
log consumption for three groups: aggregate, assetholders and non-assetholders.
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A.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We illustrate that differences between the asset-price based and the consumption-based mea-
sures of risk sharing reported in Table 1 are robust to changes in the coefficient of relative
risk aversion, η, the elasticity of substitution σ, and the fraction of assetholders ω. The first
column of Table 6 reports the benchmark model results where σ = 0.5, η = 2, ω = 0.83
and where there are spillovers across shocks. As we increase the elasticity of substitution
from σ = 0.3 to 0.5 and to 1.3, the discrepancy between the international SDF correlations
and the international correlations of aggregate consumption widens. The same is true as we
increase the coefficient of relative risk aversion, or as we reduce the fraction of assetholders.
We also illustrate the effects of shocks on active and aggregate relative consumption and
on active and inactive households, when spillovers are allowed. We report impulse responses
to 1 percent shocks to home country traded and non-traded output, and home country
money growth, while letting the off-diagonal elements of matrix A be non-zero. The impulse
responses are plotted in Figures 6 − 8. A noticeable difference from the impulse responses
plotted in the text (where spillovers are shut down) is in the impact of a non-traded shock
on foreign consumption. This is because with spillovers, the non-traded shocks in the home
country is transmitted to other shocks which have a non-zero impact on foreign consumption.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to 1% increase in YT , with spillovers to other shocks
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to 1% increase in YN , with spillovers to other shocks
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to 1% increase in µ, with spillovers to other shocks
0 4 8 12 16 20
quarters after shock
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 st
ea
dy
 st
at
e
0 4 8 12 16 20
quarters after shock
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 st
ea
dy
 st
at
e
0 4 8 12 16 20
quarters after shock
-0.7
-0.35
0
0.35
0.7
1.05
1.4
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 st
ea
dy
 st
at
e
0 4 8 12 16 20
quarters after shock
-0.7
-0.35
0
0.35
0.7
1.05
1.4
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 st
ea
dy
 st
at
e
46
